Wednesday, June 17, 2015

There are many alternatives to oil

One of the main ideas of the peak oil doom movement is that there are no possible alternatives to oil. Oil is apparently some magical irreplaceable substance with no known alternatives, and no way to find alternatives. For example, here is a recent post from a prominent peak oiler on peakoil.com:

...It is highly unlikely we will discover a viable alternative to oil... We can't invent a new energy source to oil since that would violate the laws of thermodynamics. You can't make something out of thin air just by imagining it.

As usual, that idea is factually totally wrong.

There have always been many alternatives to oil, since the beginning of the oil age. For example, cars can use electricity from batteries (most major car companies have released, or are releasing, battery-electric cars). Trains and buses can use electricity from overhead wires; more than half of rail traffic worldwide now uses this. Ships can use steam turbines which can use anything that will burn as fuel, such as coal, peat, wood chips, oil shale, torrefied biomass, etc. Internal combustion engines can use natural gas--even gas from fracking or methane hydrates. For the few uses which really require a liquid combustible fuel, there are many synthetic liquid fuels such as anhydrous ammonia, dimethyl ether, and many others. Those synthetic liquid fuels can be manufactured using electricity from renewable sources and abundant elements. All of the aforementioned alternatives have been available for many decades, and everyone in the relevant industries knows about them.

The only reason we don't use those alternatives already is price. For example, battery-electric cars and synthetic fuels are only competitive when oil costs $120/bbl or so.

When oil production enters its gradual terminal decline, the price of oil will shoot up and stay there. The economy will then gradually transition to now-cheaper alternatives. There is vastly more time than is required for the economy to transition to those alternatives (we have at least a century), and the economy has already begun transitioning to them, far earlier than required (car companies started designing plug-in vehicles at least a decade before any declines in oil production).

This kind of transition is something the economy does all the time. Companies are always evaluating alternatives and switching between them. Take ships as an example: the shipbuilding industry started off using sail, then switched to reciprocating steam engines burning coal, then switched to steam turbines burning coal, then switch to steam turbines burning oil, then switched to diesel engines burning oil. There have already been four major transitions in ship propulsion. There are many, many alternatives for the fifth transition. As another example, electricity production switched from hydroelectric, to oil, to coal, to nuclear and back, and now is switching from coal to gas in the US, because gas is now cheaper.

This notion that "there are no alternatives to oil" is just factually totally wrong.

It is also possible to use oil far more efficiently. When oil begins its very gradual decline and prices shoot up, people can buy cars such as Priuses which get twice the mileage. Shipping companies are already ordering ships that are more than twice as fuel-efficient. Cargo traffic can be switched from truck to rail which is 4x more efficient. Those things by themselves would compensate for declines in oil production for many decades.

Don't expect anything exciting or dramatic to happen to transportation networks. Granted, the price of oil may swing around wildly (because of inelasticity of demand), and there are recessions caused by many things. However, the actual supply of oil changes gradually over decades. Oil production won't enter a sustained decline for at least another decade, and the decline will be very gradual thereafter. There is a lot of time, and there are many alternatives.

Thursday, May 21, 2015

Energy decline theory is pseudoscience

Here is a response I wrote on a forum:
I'm sorry, but there's just no science happening here. It's not sufficient to say the word "science" and to use scientific-sounding terms like "biophysical". Those kinds of things are also common within pseudoscience.

What is required are specific, falsifiable, risky predictions of things which weren't happening anyway. Then those predictions must be confirmed by subsequent evidence. That is the first step toward actual science, and it has never happened and is not happening within this group.

This group has all the hallmarks of pseudoscience. It has never produced any risky, falsifiable predictions which were confirmed by subsequent evidence, not even once. There have been massive failures of prediction, over and over again, but the theories remain totally unchanged, and the failures of prediction are not even addressed. Failures of prediction are handled by making the theory less and less falsifiable ("there is now a long descent which is difficult to see", see John Greer). Members do not respond to criticism, and leave errors uncorrected when they are pointed out. Notably, this group is ignored by legitimate researchers. There is almost no interconnection between this group and actual legitimate fields of study, and this material is rarely cited outside this group. Notably, it appears that this group settles its conclusions in advance ("civilization is about to collapse"), then generates theory after theory which all lead to that conclusion, but then the predictions all fail.

If you guys want to start doing science, then you need to respond to criticism without badly misreading it, modify your theories in light of failed predictions, and make falsifiable, risky predictions which are confirmed by subsequent evidence. Those things would be the first steps toward actual science, but those things are just not happening here.
----

Here is another post from the same thread:
George, you said:
"I'm talking about net free energy per capita, not raw energy produced... The numbers you quote do not take into account the amount of that energy it took to obtain that amount...So with slowing net energy increase and increasing total population the amount of usable energy for the economy per individual is in decline."

No, that's clearly wrong. Let's do the math. According to the EIA's numbers, world energy consumption has increased from 480x10^15 to 524x10^15 btu, between 2009 and 2013 (inclusive). At the same time, world population increased from 6.83x10^9 to 7.08x10^9 people (http://www.geohive.com/earth/his_history3.aspx). That means that per-capita energy consumption has increased from 70.27x10^6 btu/capita to 74.01x10^6 btu/capita in that time. In other words, per capita energy consumption increased by 5.3% in 4 years, which is a compound growth rate of ~1.3% per year.

Now let's look at the prior 29 year period, from 1980-2009 (inclusive), using the same sources of data. Per capita energy consumption increased from 63.63x10^6 btu/capita to 70.27x10^6 btu/capita over 29 years, which is an increase of 10.4% over 29 years or only ~0.35% per year.

In other words, per capita energy consumption is not only increasing, but the rate of increase accelerated. The growth in per capita energy consumption was much faster during the period of 2009-2013 than during the prior 29 years.

Those figures are not EROI adjusted. It's impossible to find reliable statistics on worldwide average EROI.

However, it's totally implausible that average EROI worldwide has dropped by an amount sufficient to erase that acceleration in energy consumption. Even if EROI had been stable and had not declined at all over 29 years, and then suddenly dropped from 30 to 15 (a decline by half, which is totally implausible) in only the 4 year subsequent period, the EROI-adjusted per capita energy consumption still increased faster (0.5% vs 0.35%) during the period from 2009-2013 than during the prior 29 years.

The straightforward conclusion from this, is that per capita energy consumption is increasing, and the rate of increase has sped up, no matter what you think happened to EROI (within reason).

I don't know how you arrived at the conclusion that "usable energy ... per individual is in decline". Your statement is not compatible with the data which hitssquad just presented.

This is exactly the opposite of what energy doomers had predicted. They had confidently predicted a sudden collapse of civilization in the late late 2000s and rapid declines in energy consumption. What happened was the opposite of what they had predicted, yet again.
The consistent and severe failure of prediction from these theories implies that there is something seriously wrong with them. It's long overdue to start asking what is wrong.

---

Here is another post from the same thread:

Hi Harry,

I just read through the comments again, and came across yours. You said:

"Could you be very kind and point me to some of those suggestions? I am about to radically decouple!"

Harry, are you going to radically decouple because you expect civilization to collapse soon? If so, you're about to throw your life away. Civilization is not collapsing for these reasons. The most recent collapse predictions from this group are no more scientific, and no better founded, than any of their other collapse predictions over the prior decades.

This material is just totally wrong. It's littered with severe errors that invalidate its conclusions, it's ignored by almost all relevant experts, it does not meet the minimal criteria of a valid scientific theory, and it's characterized by massive, repeated failures of prediction without any corresponding correction of the underlying theories.

There have already been many people who moved out into the wilderness circa 2005 in expectation of a drastic collapse of civilization, for these reasons. They wasted ten years of their lives on a fringe doomsday theory. Do you really want to join them? Of course, you can do whatever you want, but you should clearly envision what you will feel like when five or more years have passed and civilization hasn't collapsed and not that much has happened other than you living in the middle of nowhere.


The original conversation is here.

Monday, May 11, 2015

Six Errors in ERoEI calculations

The ERoEI ratio refers to the amount of energy which we must expend in order to obtain more energy. For example, if we must use one barrel of oil in order to drill for another three barrels of oil, then the ERoEI ratio of the oil we obtained thereby is 3:1, or just 3. As another example, it may take one bushel of coal worth of energy in order to mine 10 more bushels of coal, in which case the ERoEI of the coal we obtained is 10:1, or just 10.

Different sources of energy have different ERoEI ratios. Some sources of energy (such as coal) have high ERoEI ratios, typically more than 20:1, which indicates that coal requires very little energy expenditure to obtain it. Other sources of energy, such as oil, have much lower ERoEI ratios. Some sources of energy, such as corn ethanol, take as much energy to obtain as they will yield. They provide no leftover energy to society, and have an ERoEI of 1.

The ERoEI of various energy sources has been calculated throughout various papers on that topic. There are at least 30 papers calculating the ERoEI ratio for various sources of energy such as nuclear, coal, solar PV, and others.

Unfortunately, the reported ERoEI ratios for any given energy source are often widely divergent from one paper to the next. For example, Weissbach et al[1] report an ERoEI of 75 for nuclear power, whereas another study[2] reports an ERoEI of less than 1 for the same energy source. As another example, the ERoEI of solar PV is reported as 2.3 in Weissbach et al's paper[1], and the high 30s in another paper[3]. Those kinds of discrepancies are common throughout the ERoEI literature.

Much of those discrepancies are caused by errors in the calculation of ERoEI which I will detail here. Once these errors are corrected in the offending papers, the resultant ERoEI ratios for different sources of energy become much closer together.

The errors are as follows:

Error #1: Energy returns are repeatedly treated as energy investment

It's crucial not to count energy returns as energy investment, because they are different things. It would be incorrect to include energy returns as energy investment. It would yield the wrong result. However, this mistake is made repeatedly in the papers of Charles Hall and others.

As an example, the paper[4] from C Hall (What is the Minimum EROI that a Sustainable Society Must Have?) calculates the EROI of oil. However, it includes  the energy cost of freeways, automobiles, and so on. That is a mistake, because those things are energy returns, not energy investments to obtain energy. If I drive my car down the freeway, and I'm not doing so out of necessity for gathering coal, then it was because of energy returns.

If you include all energy returns as energy investment, then the EROI of every energy source is 1. This is an application of the first law of thermodynamics. It would be highly surprising if we got more energy out of an energy source than was present within it. As a result, it is not surprising that the EROI of any energy source will converge to 1, as returns are included in the denominator. However, that does not yield any useful information, because it does not tell us how much energy is left over after obtaining the energy to provide for consumption. That is just a roundabout way of testing the first law of thermodynamics--something which has already has been tested and which could be tested far more directly. If we wish to find how much energy is left over as a return, then we must exclude returns from the denominator.

Many of the conversions of money to energy, which are found throughout the EROI literature, are implicitly committing this mistake. For example, in Hall's papers such as Spain's Photovoltaic Revolution[5] and the accompanying presentation[6]. On pp 12 of that presentation, there is a conversion of money into energy units, in order to find the energy cost of things like accountants employed by solar companies, etc. The formula presented is "At 1 Toe = 42 GJ, this represents 5.12MJ/Euro" which is derived from dividing the GDP with all energy usage in the entire country (Spain). That is a mistake, because most energy usage in the country is energy returns, not energy investment. To correct this mistake, Hall et al should take the total energy return for the country as a whole and divide it by the ERoEI which prevails for the country as a whole.

Performing this correction (assuming an average EROI of 10 for the country), by will increase the reported ERoEI of solar PV for that paper from 2.79, to 5.22. The figure of 5.22 is much closer to other reported ERoEI calculations for solar PV. This correction was performed by dividing all values by 10 which were the result of a money conversion as found in the chart on pp 12 in the above presentation[6].

Error #2: Lifetime estimates are incorrect

Many papers wrongly assume that the lifetime of an energy source is identical to its warranty period. For example, Hall et al's book[5] indicated above, and Weissbach et al's paper[1], both assume that the lifespan of a solar PV module is 25 years because that is the warranty period.

It would be highly surprising if solar PV cells failed on exactly the day their warranty expired. For example, I bought a car with a 50,000 mile warranty, but it didn't cease working at 50,000 miles.

The reason manufacturers are offering a 25 year warranty on solar cells is because they expect the vast majority of cells to last longer than that.

This error has a large effect on calculated EROI. In Weissbach et al's paper[1], the EROI of nuclear is calculated as 75 but the EROI of solar PV is calculated as 3.8, partly because nuclear plants are assumed to last twice as long as their original rated lifespan based upon observations, but solar cells are assumed to fail the exact day their warranty expires.

Even worse, many EROI papers contain incorrect aggregations of lifespan estimates. For example, C Hall's book[5] includes energy costs for things such as access roads to the solar plant, metal fence posts around the solar plant, concrete in the foundation, steel frames for the solar cells, etc. These things are grouped together with the solar cells themselves and are therefore wrongly assumed to have the same lifespan as the cells themselves. Even if the solar cells spontaneously stop working the very day their warranty expires, the rest of the plant (access roads, fences, steel frames, canals, and so on), will certainly last much longer, and would be re-used.

Error #3: Not counting embedded energy which is recovered

Papers about EROI frequently include the "embedded energy" cost of components for an energy source. For example, calculations of the EROI for solar PV often include the "embedded energy" in the aluminum frames which support the solar panels in the field.

If embedded energy is counted on the way in, then it must also be counted on the way out. These papers uniformly fail to account for the energy which is recovered when the aluminum is recycled when the frames are dismantled. The recovered energy should be counted because the aluminum will be recycled. Almost all major corporations recycle structural materials such as aluminum because they save money by doing so.

This factor alone has a large effect on the reported EROI of solar PV. Much of the energy for solar PV is actually devoted to the aluminum frames which support the panels. About 75% of the energy for manufacturing those panels would be recovered when the panels are decommissioned.

In J Lundin's paper[7], there was some confusion expressed over how much recycled material should be assumed within incoming aluminum used to build solar frames. In my opinion, the incoming aluminum should be counted as 100% virgin, and the outgoing aluminum must also be counted, and should be counted as 100% recycled minus the energy costs of recycling. This is the only correct way. If recycled aluminum is used when a power plant is constructed, then the recycled portion is displacing the usage of that recycled aluminum elsewhere, which would require precisely that amount of aluminum to be made from raw materials for something else. Thus, 100% of the aluminum used for construction of the plant should be counted as virgin. However, 100% of the aluminum which is recovered should be subtracted from energy investments (not including the energy used to recycle the aluminum) because that is displacing aluminum which would have been made from virgin material elsewhere.


Error #4: Waste heat losses are counted as energy returns

This is a recurring problem throughout the ERoEI literature. Waste heat should not be counted as energy returns because it is not usable as energy to society. The only exception is when the waste heat is actually used for something (such as combined heat and power plants), but this is rare.

This factor is parcticularly important when computing the ERoEI of oil. Oil is refined and then used as transportation fuel within vehicles. Those vehicles have engines which convert the chemical energy in fuel to kinetic energy (movement). However, the engines lose about 70% of the energy in the fuel during the conversion. This must be counted as an energy loss. As a result, the EROI of oil is overstated almost everywhere by at least a factor of 3.

In fact, it might be useful to abandon the ratio "EROI" in these cases, and adopt the ratio "thermodynamic work over energy investment" or TWoEI. It is work which we want in the economy, not waste heat.

This factor is especially important when considering the oft-repeated figure that "oil had an EROI of 100 back in 1930". This comment is frequently repeated by the doomsday prepper sect. In fact, that EROI of oil back in 1930, does not include refinery losses, nor does it count losses in internal combustion engines which were even less efficient back then. If I perform a back-of-the-envelope calculation which takes into account those two factors (100*0.7*0.15), I obtain a corrected EROI of 10.5 for oil in 1930, not 100.

Error #5: Outdated figures are used

Frequently there are large discrepancies in the EROI calculations because different technologies are assumed when calculating energy inputs. For example, there are large discrepancies of the reported EROI of nuclear power. That is partly because some papers[1] calculate the EROI using gas diffusion enrichment of uranium, while other papers calculate the EROI using centrifruge enrichment[8]. Those different assumptions will yield very different EROIs for nuclear power, because centrifuge enrichment is so much more efficient. This factor is a large part of the energy investment for nuclear power, and so has a big effect on the resultant EROI.

When calculating the EROI of an energy source, we should use the most modern technology when calculating energy inputs. We wish to know the EROI of an energy source going forward, not the EROI of an energy source if we had built it years ago.

As an example, the paper by Weissbach et al[1], in its calculations of the EROI of solar PV, assumes the Siemens process is used to generate solar PV grade silicon. However, that process has been supplanted by processes which use only 40% of the energy[9]This factor by itself increases the EROI of solar PV in Weissbach's paper from 3.8 to 6.6.

Error #6: Invalid Comparisons Are Made

The are actually different types of EROI depending upon where the boundaries are drawn for calculations. When calculating the EROI of oil, do you include refinery losses? Energy losses for the transport of oil? Waste heat losses from the car? And so on. Each one of those calculations represents a different type of EROI. Some EROI calculations attempt to include only energy inputs used for extraction at the mine mouth, whereas other EROI calculations attempt to include every energy investment in the entire economy, such as the energy investment for building rail lines to transport the coal. Those are different types of EROI.

EROI figures should not be compared if they draw the boundaries very differently. For example, there was a very famous graph from Charles Hall which makes such comparisons[9] (found here). That graph spread like wildfire throughout the peak oil community. However, that graph is repeatedly comparing different types of EROI figures which are not comparable.

For example, the comparison of the EROI of coal (about 70) to nuclear (about 10), taken from that graph. There is a big difference in the kinds of EROI for those two sources. The figure for coal is before waste heat losses are subtracted for generating electricity, whereas the figure for nuclear is after waste heat losses are subtracted. When a correction is made for that, coal has an EROI of about 24.5, compared to nuclear of 10. The discrepancy has been reduced considerably.

As another example from the same graph, oil from 1930 is reported to have an EROI of 100, whereas hydroelectric is reported to have an EROI of 30. However, the EROI of oil from does not include refinery losses and waste heat losses from interal combustion engines in 1930. Correcting these factors yields an EROI of 10.5 for oil in 1930, not 100. Of course, hydroelectric also suffers from electrical resistance losses which reduces its EROI to perhaps 25. However, the adjusted EROI ratio for oil has gone from much higher to much lower when an adjustment is made so the figures are comparable.


Conclusion

The six errors described above are widespread throughout the ERoEI literature. They are partly responsible for the wide discrepancy between reported ERoEI findings.

For example, Charles Hall et al's book[5]Spain's Photovoltaic Revolution, is committing errors #1, #2, #3, and #5. When I correct those errors and re-calculate, I obtain an EROI of 6.27 for solar PVnot 2.79 as reported.

Weissbach's paper[1] calculates an EROI of solar PV at 3.8. However, that paper is committing errors #2, #3, and #5. When I correct those errors, I obtain an EROI of 12.96, and not the 3.8 which that paper reported. Incidentally, that paper also calculates the EROI for solar in a cloudy site in Germany, and then generalizes that to the EROI of "solar PV" altogether. If I correct that factor also, and use the average insolation for the inhabited northern hemisphere, then I obtain an EROI figure of 22 for solar PVwhich is much higher than the reported figure of 3.8.

Finally, even the concept of EROI has problems. Perhaps net energy should be expressed or reported differently, using a different ratio. This is because EROI gives an exaggerated impression of the difference between energy sources. For example, assume a hypothetical energy source with an EROI of 10,000, and compare it to an energy source with an EROI of 10. The source with an EROI of 10,000 would require 0.0001% of its output (1/10000) to build another like it, whereas the source with an EROI of 10 would require only 10% of its output (1/10) to build another like it. In other words, a reduction in EROI of 99.99% led to a reduction of net energy output of only 10%. This is because EROI is less and less important as it becomes higher. Instead of using EROI, we should calculate net energy as 1-(EI/ER), and then express that as a percentage. For example, if natural gas has an EROI of 15 (everything included such as infrastructure), and solar PV has an EROI of 6.27 (everything included), then their inverted ratios are 93% and 84% respectively. This means that 7 percent of the energy from the gas plant is necessary to build another gas plant, whereas 16 percent of the energy from the solar plant is necessary to build another solar plant. The net energy available to society has declined by only 9% despite EROI falling by more than half. Thus, EROI figures give an incorrect impression, and should be calculated and reported differently.

When all the problems above are corrected, it's unclear if there is any significant difference in net energy between different methods of generating electricity. The highest EROI source (hydroelectric) requires 1.3% of its output to build another hydroelectric dam, whereas the lowest source (solar PV) requires 16%. This implies only that we would need to build slightly more solar cells (~15% more) to obtain the same net energy. Any EROI more than 5 or so makes little difference (20% at most). All common methods of generating electricity seem to exceed that threshold.

Certainly, we should investigate further into this matter. If any method of generating electricity has a disastrously low EROI (lower than 4 or so, everything included) then it would be very helpful for us to know about it. Hall's work is very useful in this regard, insofar as he attempts to include all energy investments, which will give us better approximations of relative EROIs. However, we must avoid the above mentioned errors in performing our calculations.

p.s. This paper should be seen as a draft. I will update it if any relevant objections are made.

Sunday, April 26, 2015

Civilization would rapidly rebound after a catastrophe

Here is a comment I wrote in response to an article. The article was asking whether industrial civilization could be reconstituted from scratch after a worldwide collapse. The author argues that it would be more difficult to rebuild, now that the best fossil fuels are depleted. I argue that it would be easier to industrialize the second time around. As follows:

I think that industrial civilization would be reconstituted fairly quickly, like within two centuries.
In my opinion, It would be FAR easier to industrialize the second time, despite fewer and worse fuels. Any reborn civilization would progress through the industrial revolution far faster, and far easier, than we did originally. That is because they would start with our technical knowledge, which would more than compensate for any degradation of fuel quality.
For the first 80 years, up until about 1790, steam engines had an efficiency of just 1%. Early steam engines lost 99% of their coal energy as waste heat. This was because nobody had invented the Watt engine, the Corliss engine, the Wilkonson boring machine, the compound engine, and the Parsons engine. Those basic inventions in steam technology increased the efficiency of steam engines from 1% to 15%. In other words, that basic technical knowledge allowed steam engines to obtain 15x as much power per unit of fuel. A triple expansion steam engine from 1890 is not much harder to manufacture than a Newcomen engine from 1790, but it provides 15x the work per unit of fuel. Simply understanding the basics of thermodynamics and how to build a more efficient steam engine, results in a 15x advantage.
Any reborn civilization would start with that knowledge. They would start with engines which produce 15x the power, per unit of fuel. That advantage would more than compensate for any degradation of fuel quality. Does coal really have 15x as much energy as charcoal? The answer is no.
If industrial civilization was able to advance with 1% efficient engines, then it would be able to advance with 15% efficient engines. That advantage would far outweigh any degradation of fuel quality.
As long as a few textbooks survive and those textbooks describe how to build such engines, then industrial civilization would bounce back fairly quickly. Any new industrial revolution would be far faster than the original one.
After that, if we retained even 15 textbooks about basic physics, chemistry, thermodynamics, electricity, inventions, and so on, it would be enough to bring us well into the 20th century fairly quickly.
(The original article, to which this was a response, is here.)

Sunday, February 8, 2015

Do not grow your own food

One of the major tenets of the peak oil collapse movement was that civilization will collapse and then revert to a medieval state. There will be no more electricity, gasoline, diesel, machinery, or any other conveniences of modern civilization. Instead, life will soon resemble what it was like in the 16th century. People will need to grow their own food, make tools by hand, and so on. These ideas are found throughout the works of Richard Heinberg, James Kunstler, and many, many others.

To that end, many peak oil doomers relocated to very rural areas and began growing their own food on small plots of land. Some of them also engaged in "re-skilling" which meant learning medieval crafts such as making shoes, weaving, sewing, blacksmithing, and so on. They believed (and some of them still believe) that doing so was preparation for the new medieval era which would happen after civilization collapsed from peak oil.

Some peak oilers are still doing this. Some of them are still trying to grow their own food or are considering moving to rural locations so they can grow their own food. Let me give an example from a comment I read today on peakoil.com:

I plan on buying a house in the middle of nowhere and starting to grow food there... The best way to prepare for peak oil is to grow your own food and help others grow their own food.

...and the same sentiments have been echoed thousands of times on peak oil forums. 

Unfortunately, the author of the above quotation is sadly mistaken. Growing your own food is a waste of time and is the worst way to prepare for collapse. Even if civilization were really collapsing, it would still be a waste of time to grow your own food.

Food is a about 50x cheaper now, relative to the average income, than it will be when the tractors stop running. For example, it takes a subsistence farmer about 100% of his labor to grow enough basic foodstuffs to survive, whereas it takes a modern American about 2% of his income to do the same. As a result, the rational strategy to prepare for collapse is to make as much money as possible now, and to stockpile food while it's easily obtained. You could stockpile far more food by purchasing it than you could by growing it. Furthermore, you could stockpile far more food now than you could ever hope to grow after the collapse. As a result, the best strategy is to stockpile food while it's still plentiful, not to grow it, which would be a waste of time even if civilization were collapsing.

I think the best thing to do would be to stockpile canisters of granulated sugar in some hidden remote location. Do not relocate to the hidden remote location, because that would interfere with your income and therefore with your ability to stockpile food. I would stockpile granulated sugar because it has an indefinite shelf life, is extremely cheap, is calorically dense, and could be bartered after the collapse for whatever other foods you would need. Granulated sugar would be like gold after the collapse and could be bartered for other goods.

Let's say I wanted to stockpile enough granulated sugar to provide calories for the remainder of my life. I have about 15,000 days left to live, which means I will consume (15,000*2500) 37,500,000 food calories in the remainder of my life. Since there are 4 food calories per gram of sugar, I would require 9,375,000 grams of sugar, or 9,375 kilograms, to provide enough calories for the remainder of my life. That's about 20,000 pounds of sugar, for those of us in the United States. I checked out the price of sugar at my local Sam's Club and found that it costs about $5 for a 10-pound bag. As a result, I could stockpile the 20,000 pounds of sugar I would need for approximately $10,000.

Let me repeat that fact:

I can stockpile enough food calories for the remainder of my life for $10,000.

That's about 2 months of my wages. Stockpiling food now is vastly easier than a lifetime of horrendous toil after the collapse.

Obviously, I can't live on sugar alone, but I could barter sugar for whatever other foods I would need. After the collapse, it will be calories that are in short supply. Sugar will be like gold. I could barter some of my sugar for other foods that provide the micronutrients I need. Let other people do the farming and back-breaking labor. Or, if I preferred, I could also stockpile some canned vegetables since vegetables are far cheaper now (relative to my income) than they will be after the collapse.

There is another advantage of stockpiling food rather than growing it. If the collapse prophecies fail, yet again, for the 50th time, then I've lost almost nothing. I spent $10,000 on sugar, and maybe also some money on canned vegetables, but it's still a fairly minor financial loss. By stockpiling food, I can continue living in a normal area and won't waste years or decades of my life preparing for a collapse that doesn't occur.

In short, growing your own food is the worst way of preparing for collapse, for two reasons. First, food is about 50x cheaper now (relative to the average income) than it will be after the collapse, so it makes sense to earn money and buy food now, while it's cheap. Second, if the collapse prophecies fail yet again, then I won't have wasted my life.

Growing your own food simply doesn't make sense. It doesn't make sense even if civilization were collapsing. Even if you want to prepare for collapse, the best approach would be to stockpile food and get on with your life in the mean time.

-Tom S